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There are two either explicitly or implicitly and widely accepted 
ideas about the distribution of land in Ethiopia after the reform of 
1975.  First, land distribution in rural Ethiopia is highly equitable, 
for example compared to other African countries where private 
ownership exists.  Second, the land distribution pattern currently 
observed is basically explained by what happened after the reform; 
hence, pre-reform tenures do not help us understand post-reform 
land distribution.  This paper questions both these ideas.  Using 
formal inequality indexes and a methodology that explicitly 
considers measurement errors, the empirical results indicate that 
both inter- and intra-regional inequalities are high; inequality in the 
distribution of land is as high as or even higher than other African 
countries.  The paper also argues that the post-reform distribution is 
likely influenced by pre-reform distribution and calls for a more 
detailed historical analysis that attempts to understand the link 





The dependence of a significant proportion of the world’s poor on the agricultural 
sector makes the distribution of land in rural areas an important issue for poverty 
alleviation.  In particular, the access of low income rural households to adequate 
amount of land is crucial in sustaining their livelihoods.  In recognition of this, many 
countries have undertaken land reform programmes to improve the access of 
households to land as well as decrease inequality in rural areas.  The outcome of many 
land reform programmes was mixed. 
 
Ethiopia is one of the countries that undertook a land reform programme as part of a 
larger radical socio-political and economic revolution.  In September 1974 Emperor 
Haile Selassie was overthrown in a military coup that brought an end to a very old 
dynasty that claimed to descend from the biblical King Solomon.  The overthrow of 
the emperor was followed by a series of measures that changed the political and 
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economic landscape of the country from a ‘feudal’ system towards ‘socialism’.     
Among the many radical measures
2, the land reform proclamation of February 1975 
nationalised all rural land.  The heterogeneous and age-old land tenure of the imperial 
period was replaced by a system where all land is owned by the state and given to 
farmers on use-right (usufruct) basis.  Commercial large-scale modern farms were 
turned into state farms.  Peasant associations (PAs) were set up on approximately 800 
hectares to allocate land to farmers living in their jurisdiction according to family size.  
The allocation of land by the PAs includes not only the initial distribution after the 
land reform proclamation but also further distributions and re-distributions done at 
various frequencies.  After their establishment, PAs effectively functioned as local 
governments radically transforming the political administration of rural areas from 
that of the imperial regime dominated by the nobility. 
 
The truly radical nature of the land reform programme and the other economic 
measures after the revolution of 1974 have created a widespread belief not only 
among politicians but also researchers that the distribution of land in rural Ethiopia is 
highly equitable, for example, more equitable than other African countries with 
private and traditional forms of land ownership.  The following quotation from a 
government document illustrates this: 
 
“The low level of [income] inequality is consistent with the overall picture of 
Ethiopia as a very poor country, with a low per capita income.  In addition, the 
egalitarian land holding system might have contributed to a more equal income 
distribution in rural Ethiopia.” (FDRE, 2002; italics mine) 
 
Even though the above quotation is taken from a government document, it also 
reflects a widely held view among researchers of rural development in Ethiopia.  The 
following quotation from a paper by one of the leading Ethiopian researchers on rural 
development reflects this fact. 
 
“This paper is an attempt to argue, in broad terms, that the social homogeneity in 
rural Ethiopia today, which is in large measure a consequence of the land system, 
is an inhibiting factor for agrarian development.” (D. Rahmato, 2005; italics mine) 
 
Rahmato is discussing social homogeneity, a concept that covers more than only land 
inequality.  But the belief that land is distributed in a more equitable manner in 
Ethiopia is one of the likely reasons for believing in the existence of social 
homogeneity. 
 
The widespread consensus that land is distributed equitably has partly influenced the 
nature of the debate on land policy in Ethiopia.  For example, most of the debate 
focuses on other issues like security of tenure.  The possible increase in inequality is 
given as an argument against privatisation of land with the implicit understanding that 
inequality can only go higher. 
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introduced after the revolution of 1974 include: nationalisation of all medium and large-scale 
manufacturing enterprises, banks, insurance and other modern financial institutions;  nationalisation of 
urban land and additional houses than the house families live in; huge villagisation programme that 
moved millions of people from dispersed settlements to nucleated and centrally planned villages; re-
settlement programmes and limited collectivisation of agriculture.   3
 
A second widely – either implicitly or explicitly – held view is that the current 
distribution of land in different localities has no link with pre-reform land tenures.  
Studies on the current distribution of land focus on changes that happened after the 
land reform and don’t question if the current patterns are at least partially influenced 
by older tenure systems.  That the land reform programme has created a clean break 
between the current and older tenure systems is a widely accepted viewpoint. 
 
This paper questions the above described two widely accepted views: Is rural land 
distribution in Ethiopia highly equitable as generally accepted?  Is there a link 
between current land distribution patterns and pre-reform tenures?  The first question 
is addressed by using a methodology that uses formal measures of inequality with 
‘dirty data’.  Properly addressing the second question requires detailed information on 
pre-reform land tenures and the process of land allocation after the reform; this is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  But some supporting evidence and general 
discussions on the link between pre-and post-reform land distributions are given. 
 
The following are the main conclusions.  Rural land distribution in Ethiopia is not as 
equitable as generally accepted; it is as inequitable as, if not more inequitable, some 
other African countries with private ownership and land markets.  In addition, it 
seems inequality in post-reform land distribution is at least partly explained by pre-
reform land tenures. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way.  Section 2 presents sources of data and 
some descriptive results.  The methodology is described in Section 3.  While Section 
4 presents the main results on the inequality measures, Section 5 discusses the 
possible link between pre- and post-reform land distribution.  Section 6 gives the 
conclusions. 
2. Data and general patterns of land distribution 
 
This study uses data from the Ethiopia Rural Household Surveys (ERHS) conducted 
by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University, the Centre for the Study 
of African Economies (CSAE) of Oxford University and the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  The surveys covered around 1500 households in 
fifteen different villages (peasant associations) dispersed over the main settled 
agricultural areas of Ethiopia; the surveys are longitudinal and attrition rates are 
relatively low. So far, the ERHS has been conducted for six rounds excluding the 
initial limited survey done by IFPRI in 1989; three rounds in 1994-5, one round each 
in 1997, 1999 and 2004.  This paper uses the data from the two rounds of 1995 and 
1997, twenty years after the land reform proclamation. 
 
As indicated in the introductory part, all rural land in Ethiopia is owned by the state 
allocated to farmers on a use right basis.  Hence, land allocation by the peasant 
associations (PAs) is the main means through which households get access to land; 
but it is not the only means.  In addition to the allocation by PAs, households can rent 
in land either in the form of fixed rent or sharecropping; they can also borrow and get 
land as gift.  Most of the land used by households is allocated by PAs.  This paper   4
looks at distribution of land allocated by PAs which accounts for the overwhelming 
majority of land cultivated by households.
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The distribution of PA allocated land can be examined at different levels: total 
household, per capita or per adult land holdings.  This paper looks at all the three.  
Examining the different levels is important as demographic compositions of 
households vary.  
 
Analysis of the distribution of land is complicated by differences in the quality of 
land.  If PAs allocated land by strictly taking into account quality, land size figures 
will be misleading; smaller size plots are consistently of better quality than larger size 
plots and the difference in size distribution would systematically ignore this quality 
difference that compensates for size.  If PAs have consistently considered quality of 
land in their allocations, one should observe strong systematic correlation between 
land size and land quality indicators.  To examine if the land holdings of households 
are systematically related to quality measures, the land holdings of households are 
regressed on quality indicators by controlling for village level effects (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Village level fixed effects regressions of PA allocated land on measures 
of land quality 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. error  t  P>¦t¦  95% c.i. 
Household size  0.1246  0.0121  10.35  0.000  0.1010-0.1482 
Perleum 0.1493  0.0911  1.64  0.101  -0.0293-0.3280 
Permedda -0.1678  0.1017  -1.65  0.099  -0.3671-0.0316 




Number of observations = 2620; Number of groups = 15; R-sq:  within = 0.0413; between = 0.0576; 
overall = 0.0117; F(3,2602) = 37.38; Prob > F = 0.0000; corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1286; F test that all u_i=0: 
F(14, 2602) = 82.82; Prob > F = 0.0000 
  
  Coefficient  Std. error  t  P>¦t¦  95% c.i. 
Household size  0.1253  0.0120  10.40  0.000  0.1017-0.1489 
Perteuf -0.0499  0.1180  -0.42  0.672  -0.2813-0.1814 
Perdaget 0.1291  0.1005  1.29  0.199  -0.0679-0.3261 




Number of observations = 2620; Number of groups = 15; R-sq:  within = 0.0403; between = 0.0753; 
overall = 0.0115; F(3,2602) = 36.45; Prob > F = 0.0000; corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1245 ;F test that all u_i=0: 
F(14, 2602) = 84.45; Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Soil quality in rural Ethiopia is roughly categorised into leum, leum-teuf and teuf 
(fertile, semi-fertile and infertile).  The variables designated as ‘perleum’ and 
‘perteuf’ in the regressions represent the percentages of household land categorised as 
                                                 
3 Kebede (2004) indicates that the rental market –fixed rent and sharecropping –has an equalising 
effect, i.e., inequality of PA allocated land is higher than that of inequality of cultivated land the 
difference between the two mainly being rented land.   5
‘leum’ and ‘teuf’ respectively.  Another aspect of land quality is its slope.  The slope 
in most areas is classified into three: medda, dagethema and gedel (flat, gentle slope 
and steep slope).  In the regressions, permedda and perdaget represent the percentages 
of household land classified as medda and dagethema.  Since these measures of land 
quality are strongly correlated with village level characteristics, the regressions 
control for village level fixed effects. 
 
The regression results in Table 1 indicate that there are no strong statistically 
significant correlations between total land holdings of households and land quality 
measures; all the coefficients on the quality measures are not significant at 
conventional levels.
4  These results indicate that an analysis of inequality that takes 
total household land holdings will not be systematically biased due to quality 
differences. 
 
Table 2 presents the mean, median, 1, 5, 95 and 99 percentiles of PA allocated land 
by all households.  The figures in the table clearly show that land holding by the 
average household is very small.  For example, the median land size of a household is 
only 1 hectare dropping to 0.19 in per capita terms.  In addition, while more than 5% 




Table 2: Mean, median and percentiles of PA allocated land for all households 
PA allocated land (ha.)  Summary statistics 
Total  Per capita  Per adult 
Mean  1.688   0.335   0.586  
Median  1.000  0.188   0.313  
1% 0.000  0.000  0.000 
5% 0.000  0.000  0.000 
95%  5.500  1.125   2 .000 
99%  9.688   2.125   4 .000 
 
The average figures reported in Table 2 conceal variations between villages.  To see 
the differences between the average land holdings of households in the different 
villages, while Table 3 reports the mean and median PA allocated land by villages, 
Figure 1 presents the corresponding histograms.  
 
These descriptive results illustrate both the significant inter- as well as intra-village 
variations in the distribution of land.  For example, the mean household land size in 
Debre Berhan – with the largest mean – is more than ten times that of Geblen (the 
smallest).  These differences become even more pronounced for per capita and per 
adult figures.  In addition to these significant inter-village variations, the histograms 
                                                 
4 If quality of land is strictly taken into account by PAs when allocating land, in the regressions we 
would have got negative and significant coefficients for indicators of high quality land (perleum and 
permedda) and positive and significant coefficients for indicators of poor quality land (perteuf and 
perdaget).  While the proportions of poor quality land – perteuf and perdaget – are totally insignificant 
that for good land become significant at around 10%; but note that the coefficient for perleum is with 
the wrong sign. 
5 The land reform proclamation prohibits households to own more than 10 hectares of land; but there 
are a few households in the sample with more than 10 ha.    6
for the villages indicate significant variations.  The histograms also illustrate that the 
pattern of distribution between villages is significantly different from each other.
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Table 3: Mean and median PA allocated land by survey villages (in hectares) 
Total  Per capita  Per adult  Village 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Haresaw  0.58 0.50 0.19 0.10 0.35 0.17 
Geblen  0.38 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.13 
Dinki  1.21 1.25 0.31 0.25 0.47 0.45 
Debre  Berhan  3.85 3.50 0.80 0.67 1.53 1.25 
Yetmen  1.81 1.46 0.40 0.31 0.70 0.57 
Shumsheha  1.48 1.25 0.34 0.28 0.61 0.50 
Sirbana  Godeti  1.41 1.50 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.35 
Adele  Keke  1.42 1.25 0.28 0.21 0.49 0.38 
Korodegaga  3.33 3.25 0.60 0.50 0.96 0.81 
Terufe  Kechema  1.20 1.00 0.18 0.15 0.27 0.22 
Imdibir  0.48 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.03 
Aze  Deboa  0.86 0.73 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.15 
Adado  1.34 0.48 0.23 0.10 0.46 0.17 
Gara  Godo  0.79 0.50 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.13 
Domaa  2.42 2.10 0.52 0.41 0.81 0.74 
 
 
The above descriptive results cast a shadow of doubt on the widely accepted view that 
land distribution in rural Ethiopia is highly equitable.  To more deeply examine the 
issue, formal measures of inequality are required.  A more appropriate methodology 
should take into account the effect of measurement errors on the formal indexes of 
inequality.  The next section outlines the methodology used in this paper that 
explicitly considers measurement errors. 
3. Methodology 
 
The relevance and accuracy of any empirical analysis is obviously dependent on 
quality of data.  Evidently, if there are reasons to believe that the available data – in 
our case land size of households – are completely unreliable one should not use them.  
Since average land size figures from the data set compare well with figures from other 
sources
7 there is no apparent reason to make us believe that the data are completely 
unreliable. 
                                                 
6 Histograms for per capita and per adult land holdings of villages are also very different from each 
other. 
7 For example, the mean per household and per capita land reported in Jayne, et al. (2003) that used 
nationally representative data are respectively 1.17 and 0.24 ha; the corresponding figures for PA 
allocated land in the data set used here are 1.69 and 0.34 ha.  The figures are also similar to other 
studies; for example, see Amare (1994)   7 
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Unfortunately, the overall reliability of the data alone is not sufficient for the 
computation of appropriate formal indices of inequality because most inequality 
indices are sensitive to even minor contamination.  The contamination of data can be 
either in the form of data errors during collection, coding and transcribing or 
inaccurate reporting (over- or under-reporting) or it could also be due to true outliers – 
observations with high leverage. 
 
This paper uses the methodology suggested by Cowell and Victoria-Feser (2002) to 
handle the measurement of inequality using dirty data.  The main ideas are 
summarised in the following paragraphs. 
 
Let X be a random variable with probability distribution F; X is income in the case of 
income distribution and PA allocated land size in our case.  Consider an elementary 
distribution H





z Hx z ι =≥ …..  (1) 
 
whereι  is the indicator function ι (D) = {1 if D is true, 0 otherwise}.  Suppose there is 
a small amount of undetectable contamination at z in the income (land) distribution.  
The distribution observed is no more the true distribution F but a mixture distribution 
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The parameter ε represents the importance of the contamination relative to the true 
distribution; an observation from the contaminated data 
() ()
z Fx ε has probability of (1 - 
ε) being generated by F and probability of ε being equal to z (the error).  If the 
contamination of the data is large relative to the true data – i.e., ε is near 1 – one 
shouldn’t expect to do any reasonable analysis by using the data.  But one should also 
be concerned if the inequality measures are not robust for relatively minor 
contamination.  The robustness of inequality measures for minor contamination can 
be made more precise by using the idea of influence function.  To identify the effect 
of minor contamination, the influence function is generated by taking the derivative of 
the observed distribution, Fε
(z), when ε→ 0.  For any measure of inequality T, the 
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The IF measures the effect of an infinitesimal amount of contamination at point z on 
the inequality measure T.  If the IF is unbounded for some z the inequality measure T 
is non-robust to the data contamination. 
   9
Cowell and Flachaire (2002) and Cowell and Litchfield (1999) show that 
contamination at the tails of the distribution rather than elsewhere are more likely to 
significantly influence the values of the inequality index.  Hence, an analysis of 
inequality with contaminated data must examine how much sensitive the index is to 
the inclusion and exclusion of outliers.  Trimming the distribution at different levels 
on either one or both sides and re-calculating the inequality index to see its robustness 
is one of the practical ways to overcome the problem.   In general, inequality 
measures are more sensitivity to data at high and low levels (more at high than low 
levels), while middle level values have only small influence.  In addition, the 
influence on different inequality measures also varies (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 
2002). 
 
The next section summarises the main results from the analysis that used the 
methodology outlined above. 
4. Inequality in the distribution of land: Empirical results 
 
A cursory look at the box-and-whiskers plots (see Figure 2) for total, per capita and 
per adult PA allocated land show some values – on the upper end – outside the 
adjacent lines (‘whiskers’); given the discussion in the methodology section, if there 
are influential observations, these are likely to be the ones.  Another important feature 
of the plots is that because land size is bounded by zero from below and most land 




Disaggregating the data into village level plots also give a similar picture (see Figure 
3 for the box-and-whiskers plot for total PA allocated land by survey villages).  The 
few outliers in the village distribution are more starkly illustrated in these plots.
9 
 
In this paper the Gini coefficient and four versions of the Generalised Entropy (GE) 
index are computed for total, per capital and per adult PA allocated land; the four GE 
indexes are the Theil index (with α = 1), mean log deviation (α = 0), entropy index (α 
= -1) and half of the coefficient of variance (α = 2).  First, the whole data are used to 
compute the five indexes.  Then, the same indexes are re-computed after trimming the 
distribution in the following ways: 
 
1.  trimming 1% from the top 
2.  trimming 5% from the top 
3.  trimming 1% from both top and bottom 
4.  trimming 5% from both top and bottom 
5.  trimming 10% from both top and bottom and 
6.  dropping zeros (landless). 
 
                                                 
8 Other graphical representations of distributions like Penn’s parade of dwarfs and few giants in 
addition to box-and-whiskers plots also show a similar picture. 
9 In addition to the potential significant outliers, the positions of the box-and-whiskers plots for each 
village indicate significant inter-regional variation which was brought out by the village-level 
histograms presented in Section 2.   10
Figure 2: Box-and-Whisker plots for total, per capita and per adult PA allocated 
land 
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The inequality indexes for total, per capital and per adult PA allocated land with or 
without trimming are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Inequality measures with and without trimming land distribution 
 Gini  coefficient  GE(α=1) GE(α=0) GE(α= -1)   GE(α=2) 
Total PA allocated land 
All data  0.5585  0.4717  0.6017  12.0408  0.6215 
1% from top  0.5391  0.4198  0.5626  11.3570  0.4899 
5% from top  0.5068  0.3530  0.4987  10.1209  0.3709 
1% from both  0.5004  0.4198  0.5626  11.3570  0.4899 
5% from both  0.4635  0.3530  0.4987  10.1209  0.3709 
10% from both  0.4193  0.2841  0.3623  0.6825  0.2863 
dropping 0s  0.5218  0.4717  0.6017  12.0408  0.6215 
Per capita PA allocated land 
All data  0.5871  0.5574  0.6701  13.9124  0.9084 
1% from top  0.5578  0.4596  0.6066  12.7514  0.5610 
5% from top  0.5222  0.3802  0.5318  11.1878  0.4104 
1% from both  0.5207  0.4597  0.6066  12.7514  0.5610 
5% from both  0.4802  0.3802  0.5318  11.1878  0.4104 
10% from both  0.4363  0.3080  0.3916  0.7630  0.3178 
dropping 0s  0.5529  0.5574  0.6701  13.9124  0.9084 
Per adult PA allocated land 
All data  0.5957  0.5826  0.6888  8.3176  0.9572 
1% from top  0.5635  0.4763  0.6172  7.5134  0.5942 
5% from top  0.5230  0.3839  0.5319  6.4667  0.4115 
1% from both  0.5285  0.4763  0.6172  7.5134  0.5942 
5% from both  0.4829  0.3839  0.5319  6.4667  0.4115 
10% from both  0.4392  0.3116  0.3924  0.7370  0.3206 
dropping 0s  0.5637  0.5826  0.6888  8.3176  0.9572 
Note: GE(α=1) =Theil index; GE(α=0) = Mean log deviation; GE(α= -1) = Entropy index; GE(α=2) 
=Half coefficient of variance 
 
For distribution of land, trimming only from above is a more appropriate procedure.  
In the case of income distribution, very low levels of income (or zero incomes) can be 
treated as errors of data collection as a minimum level is required for survival.  For 
land distribution, zero values represent the landless, a real and important 
phenomenon.  Hence, our preferred estimates are those from distributions trimmed 
from above. 
 
Similar to the results of Cowell and Flachaire (2002), the Gini coefficient is generally 
more robust compared to the Generalised Entropy indexes.  To illustrate this finding, 
the decreases in the inequality indexes for different levels of trimming (influence 
functions) are given in Figure 4; the bars indicate by what percentage the indexes 
decrease compared to the case where the whole data are used.  As can be seen from 
the graph, for total, per capita and per adult land size the Gini coefficient is almost 
always more robust for different levels trimming.
10  Even after dropping 20% of the 
                                                 
10 Zero values are dropped in the computation of the Generalised Entropy indexes; this is the reason 
why when zeros are dropped the indexes do not decrease while the Gini coefficients do.  The fact that 
Gini coefficient considers zero values while the others don’t is another reason for preferring the former.   13
data with 10% trimming from both sides, the Gini coefficient falls by only around 
25%. 
 
The figures in Table 4 clearly indicate that even after handling influential 
observations, the inequality measure are still relatively high.  Gini coefficients range 
from 42%-56% for total, 44%-59% for per capita and 44%-60% for per adult land 
holdings; even in the cases where 20% of the data in trimmed, the Gini coefficients 
are more than 40%.  Comparing our results with some estimates of Gini coefficients 
for African countries illustrates the point.  Table 5 presents the Gini coefficients for 
Ethiopia and other four African countries for smallholder farms done by another 
study; these coefficients are computed without trimming the data implying the figures 
would be lower if trimmed.  The Gini coefficient for total land for Ethiopia computed 
by the study is equal to our estimates without trimming; this indicates that data used 
here compare well with nationally representative data.  Secondly, the coefficients 
computed here even after trimming the data are either comparable to or higher than 
the coefficients for the other African countries.  Note that these other African 
countries have much more developed land markets and private ownership in land as 
compared to Ethiopia where land is in the hands of the state.  These results are in 
strong contrast to the dominant view that inequality of land in Ethiopia is very low. 
 
Table 5: Gini coefficients of smallholder land distribution in selected African 
countries 
Country  Land per household  Land per capita  Land per adult 
Kenya 0.55  0.56  0.54 
Ethiopia 0.55  0.55  0.55 
Rwanda 1990  0.43  0.43  0.41 
Rwanda 2000  0.52  0.54  0.54 
Zambia 0.44  0.50  0.51 
Mozambique 0.45 0.51  0.48 
 
The same procedure of trimming the distribution and computing the inequality 
indexes is also done on village levels; Table 6 presents the results for each sample 
village for total household land holdings.  As expected, intra-village inequality is 
more sensitive to the treatment; this is partly due to lower number of observations.  
But still significant levels of intra-village inequality exist after the treatment.  For 
example, with 5% trimming from top, the Gini coefficients range from 23%-62% 
indicating relatively high intra-village inequality in at least some villages. 
 
The village level Gini coefficients imply large variations in inequality between 
different regions of the country.  Inequality indices are summary measures indicating 
average conditions, hence looking at the whole distribution is important.  To do that 
Figure 5 presents the Lorenz curves for each village with 5% trim from the top.  As 
the figures illustrate, the Lorenz curves of some villages clearly dominate others 
indicating first order stochastic dominance; this implies, inequality in some villages 
are definitely higher than in other villages. 
   14
Table 6: Gini coefficients for total land household land holdings with and 






















Haresaw 0.4340  0.2796 0.2510 0.2504 0.2061 0.0756  0.4171 
Geblen 0.4704  0.3323 0.3097 0.2737 0.2475 0.1013  0.4255 
Dinki 0.4289  0.4221 0.4205 0.2418 0.2132 0.2132  0.2535 
Debre 
berhan 
0.3396  0.3274 0.3125 0.2856 0.2671 0.2132  0.2991 
Yetmen 0.4745  0.4144 0.3428 0.3642 0.2842 0.2454  0.4303 
Shumsheha 0.4954  0.4669 0.4495 0.3712 0.3456 0.3276  0.4061 
Sirbana 
godeti 
0.3394  0.3305 0.3247 0.2017 0.1869 0.1776  0.2140 
Adele keke  0.3644  0.3376 0.3046 0.2872 0.2481 0.2112  0.3166 
Korodegaga 0.2989 0.2799 0.2640 0.2441 0.2257 0.1813  0.2645 
Turufe 
kechema 
0.4398  0.3768 0.3297 0.3572 0.2939 0.2420  0.4222 
Imdibir 0.7430  0.5667 0.3713 0.5563 0.3418 0.2900  0.7369 
Aze deboa  0.3654  0.2734 0.2309 0.2473 0.2016 0.1701  0.3611 
Adado 0.7015  0.6549 0.6224 0.6381 0.6001 0.5417  0.6875 
Gara godo  0.5017  0.4440 0.3172 0.4057 0.2663 0.2363  0.4678 
Domaa 0.3825  0.3708 0.3502 0.3453 0.3174 0.2555  0.3578 
 
The inequality differences between villages can also be examined while 
simultaneously considering mean land holdings by using generalised Lorenz curves.
11  
If some villages have higher average land size and lower inequality, inhabitants of 
these villages on the average are much better off.  Figure 6 presents the generalised 
Lorenz curves of each village and it is clear that the curves for some villages 
dominate the others (second order stochastic dominance).  This is an indication that 
the land distribution system maintains a situation where some regions enjoy the best 
of both worlds compared to others – low inequality and larger mean land size. 
                                                 
11 Generalised Lorenz curve is generated by multiplying the ordinary Lorenz curve by the mean land 
size.   15
Figure 4: Influence functions for total, per capita and per adult PA allocated land 
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Generalised lorenz curve for paland5a (5% trimmed from top
 
   17
To summarise, the reform of 1975 has not created a highly equitable distribution of 
land as generally accepted; the level of inequality is either equal or higher than those 
found in other African countries.  Hence, the widely held consensus that land is more 
equitably distributed in Ethiopia doesn’t seem to hold even when analysing the data 
taking measurement errors into account. 
 
As indicated in the introductory part, another either explicitly or implicitly widely 
held view is that the pre-reform land tenures have no influence on post-reform 
distribution of land.  The next section discusses the possible link between pre- and 
post-reform land distribution. 
5. Was the revolution a clean break from the past? 
 
When analysing the distribution of rural land in Ethiopia, researchers mainly or only 
consider changes after the reform with the implicit or explicit assumption that pre-
reform land tenure systems don’t affect post-reform distribution.  The radical social, 
economic and political transformation brought about by the land reform programme 
makes it difficult to assume otherwise.  But in this section, it is argued that pre-reform 
land tenures probably have a significant influence on post-reform land distribution. 
 
As indicated previously, after the land reform proclamation of February 1975 PAs 
were set up in rural areas to allocate land among their members (in addition to other 
responsibilities).  Obviously, the PAs would start with the existing distribution that 
was determined by pre-reform land tenures; it is not like a resettlement programme on 
uninhabited land where one can start with a desired distribution because there is no 
previous tenure system.  Since PAs didn’t take all land from their members and 
distribute it afresh, one should logically expect a lot to be carried over from the past 
into post-reform distribution. 
 
The empirical evidence from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) confirms 
the above.  In one of the survey rounds, households were asked how they acquired 
each plot of land.  In 1995, from the total land holdings of surveyed households 
36.6% was acquired through inheritance and purchases made in the pre-reform period.  
From the fifteen surveyed villages in two – Adele Keke and Adado – more than 90% 
of their land was acquired before the reform; in other two villages – Imdibir and Aze 
Deboa – the figures range between 80% and 90% and the corresponding percentages 
for Gara Godo and Haresaw are 70% and 41%.  From the fifteen survey villages, in 
six of them at least 40% of their land holdings were acquired before the land reform.  
These results show that even 20 years after a radical land reform programme the 
hang-over from older tenure systems is substantial for a significant number of 
villages.  This casts a shadow of doubt on the usual implicit assumption that older 
tenure structures do not affect current distribution. 
 
The second reason which makes one doubt the assumption of a clean break with the 
older tenures is that implementation of the land reform was heterogeneous.  There was 
no national and detailed guideline on how to allocate land and PAs were basically left 
to their own device to decide on the ‘allocation rule’.  The proclamation provides that 
any person who is “willing to personally cultivate land shall be allotted rural land 
sufficient for his maintenance and that of his family” (Rahmato, 1984).  What is 
meant by ‘maintenance’ and ‘family’ can mean different things and hence even in the   18
case where PAs tried to follow the proclamation to the letter it can be implemented in 
different ways.  This is in fact what actually happened as illustrated by the following 
quotation from Rahmato (1984): 
 
“The method of land distribution, and the criteria used varied not only from 
one locality to another but within each locality as well.  Indeed, each PA 
adopted its own formula and decided how and to whom to apportion land 
within its jurisdiction”. 
 
If actual distributions were not homogenous across regions of the country, it is very 
likely that these heterogeneous allocations were influenced by tenure structures in the 
pre-reform period.  The farmers elected to PAs are people that grew-up within the 
older tenure systems; it is highly likely that the allocation rule they followed was 
influenced by the nature of the tenure structures they know about – land tenure 
systems that existed in their localities.  The heterogeneity in the implementation of the 
land reform programme is likely related – at least partly – to the heterogeneity of the 
pre-reform land tenure systems. 
 
The third reason to expect a link between pre- and post-reform land distribution is 
related to the institutional constraints created by the land reform proclamation itself.  
The proclamation nationalised all rural land and abolished the land market.  It 
prohibited the hiring of labour abolishing the legal labour market until 1990 when the 
‘mixed economy’ policy was proclaimed.  PAs were allocating land only to farmers 
within their jurisdiction; people from outside the PA – either from other rural or urban 
areas – cannot ask for land.  If farmers migrate from a PA they are bound to lose their 
land.  All these institutional changes are bound to decrease mobility and consequently 
slow down changes in relative factor endowments in different regions; for example, it 
is difficult to move from densely to sparsely populated regions and get access to land.  
For households with access to land, it is also difficult to migrate to other areas (urban 
or rural) due to fear of losing land.  All these dampened possible changes in land-to-
labour ratios in different parts of the country.  These institutional constraints probably 
have exacerbated inter-regional inequalities. 
 
The institutional constraints listed above have constrained some of the dynamic 
changes that were significantly transforming traditional tenures before the land reform 
at least in some regions of the country.  For example, rural land markets were 
developing fast in many regions of the country including those with more ‘communal’ 
type of tenures undermining traditional systems; more and more urban dwellers were 
purchasing rural land with formal titling.  Even though it is very difficult to speculate 
in what direction land inequality would have changed if these processes were allowed 
to continue for a long time, it is probably evident that these changes were significantly 
affecting the pattern of land distribution.  By stopping these developments the land 
reform has probably helped to preserve a lot of pre-reform land distribution patterns.  
By both warding off outsiders from the land within the jurisdiction of individual PAs 
and creating a disincentive against out-migration of local people, the land reform 
programme created an institutional framework that protects localities from outside 
forces and correspondingly trapped them in previous conditions. 
 
To properly analyse the link between pre- and post-reform land distribution, detailed 
information on pre-reform land tenures in each village and how post-reform   19
distribution was done over time is required; this is not available.  In the data set used 
here only information on post-reform distribution is available.  To have a very rough 
idea of the possible link between pre-and post-reform distribution, the post-reform 
distribution is related to general and main features of pre-reform tenure systems in the 
surveyed villages.  To do that, the fifteen survey villages are classified into four 
groups depending on the nature of their pre-reform land tenures. 
 
One of the important land tenure systems in pre-reform Ethiopia was the rist system 
which depended on ambilineal (cognatic) descent; people can inherit land from both 
their parents.
12  The first group (‘group 1’) of villages are those where the rist system 
was dominant at the time of the reform proclamation; these include Haresaw, Geblen, 
Debre Berhan, Yetmen and Shumsheha.  The second group of villages (‘group 2’) are 
located in areas where non-rist land tenure systems were dominant but these 
traditional tenures were undermined by the emergence of land markets with more 
formal titling;  Dinki, Sirbana Godeti, Adele Keke, Korodegaga and Turufe Kechema 
are included in this category.  The third group of villages (‘group 3) more or less 
maintained their traditional non-rist tenure structures; Imdibir, Aze Deboa, Adado and 
Gara Godo are included here.  The fourth group (‘group 4’) is constituted of only one 
village (Domaa) that was set up after the reform as a re-settlement village. 
 
The Gini coefficients for the four groups of villages are computed for all the data as 
well as after trimming from top at 1% and 5% (see Table 7).  As expected, the lowest 
coefficient is for the re-settlement village; because land allocation in re-settlement on 
uninhabited land starts afresh
13 – no ‘baggage’ from the past – it is expected to be 
more equitable.  Land distribution in villages located in more traditional tenures 
(group 1 & 3) is more inequitable as compared to those where traditional systems 
have been undermined (group 2).  A similar conclusion is arrived if Lorenz curves on 
the whole distribution instead of summary statistics (Gini coefficient) are used (see 
Figure 7); while the Lorenz curve for the re-settlement village first order dominates 
all the rest, the one for villages where traditional systems have been undermined 
dominates the two for more traditional tenure systems. 
 
Table 7: Gini coefficients for villages grouped according to pre-reform land 
tenures 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
All  data  0.5618 0.4425 0.6465 0.3825 
1% from top  0.5468  0.4180  0.5850  0.3708 
5% from top  0.5268  0.3951  0.4981  0.3502 
Note: Group 1= rist tenure; Group 2 = non-rist with significant changes; Group 3 = non-rist with 
traditional tenures; Group 4 = post-land reform re-settlement village 
 
                                                 
12 The classic reference for the rist system is Hoben (1973). 
13 In many instances in Ethiopia re-settlements have occurred in officially ‘unsettled’ but actually land 
used by the original inhabitants.   20










































Lorenz curve for paland5t (by old land tenure)
 
Note: Group 1= rist tenure; Group 2 = non-rist with significant changes; Group 3 = non-rist with 
traditional tenures; Group 4 = post-land reform re-settlement village 
 
 
As argued previously, if some of the inequality in post-reform distribution reflects 
conditions before the reform, the above results imply that land was distributed more 
equitably in those areas where traditional structures were undermined.  This probably 
should not be surprising because even those ‘communal’ types of traditional land 
tenure systems, like the rist, were characterised by competition and differentiation.
14  
 
In addition, if the thesis that pre-reform tenures significantly affect post-reform 
distribution is true, the relatively high level of inequality observed in post-reform 
Ethiopia compared to other African countries can be a reflection of the historical 
difference in land distribution; if distribution of land in pre-reform Ethiopia was more 
inequitable than the other African countries, the hangover from previous tenures is 
still observed in post-reform Ethiopia mainly as historically inherited inequality. 
 
As indicated above, to definitely address these issues, knowledge on local pre-reform 
land tenures and detailed information on the process of post-reform land allocation in 
PAs is required – this requires a research in economic history.  This inquiry would not 
only be an exercise in pursuit of historical curiosity but also an important component 
to understand the current land distribution system. 
 
The next section presents some conclusions. 
 
                                                 
14 See Hoben (1973).   21
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines two widely accepted ideas about the distribution of land in rural 
Ethiopia.  Contrary to widely accepted views, the empirical results using the formal 
indexes of inequality that take measurement errors into account indicate that 
inequality in the distribution of land in rural Ethiopia is relatively high.  In addition, 
the paper argues that the post-reform land distribution probably is affected by pre-
reform land tenure systems and calls for a detail historical analysis of old tenure 
structures and the process of land distribution after the land reform programme. 
 
Most debates and researches on land related issues in rural Ethiopia mainly revolve 
around questions of security of holdings, degradation of soil quality, fragmentation of 
farms and similar problems.  This paper attempts to highlight a relatively neglected 
area of research – inequality in distribution of land.  In addition, it argues that a proper 
understanding of current land distribution requires an understanding of the 
evolutionary link with the older tenure structures.  Further research, particularly in the 
form of economic historical analysis, to understand the link with older tenure systems 
is probably one of the fruitful avenues that can lead to a more profound understanding 
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